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巴罗 - 戈登模型

货币政策的理论模型与货币政策在现实世界中的执行程度之间存在何种程度的脱节? 你的答案应该利用我们在讲座中提到的货币政策的理论模型,以及你对英格兰银行货币政策框架的知识(最小950字,最大1000字)。

近几十年来,围绕货币政策的理论发生了根本性的变化,最终形成了中央银行的体制结构和政策。 直到最近,焦点集中在“强制性,独立性和问责性”(Svensson,2009)上,该理论模型非常反映了理论模型,然而经济与当前金融危机的转变性质意味着理论与实践之间更大的脱节。

巴罗 - 戈登模型描绘了政策制定者在创造货币政策时所面临的选择。 政策制定者制造意外通胀的动机如下:

(摘自“巴罗戈登规则与裁量权的模型”,Costain)

这种就业暂时上涨的诱惑与政府在选举前取得高成绩的压力相关。 问题变得时间不符合理性预期和多期模型。 政府的最优政策是积极的通货膨胀,代理商知道并因此设定期望值等于。 这演示了绑定规则的最佳结果。

规则与自由裁量权辩论强调了限制政府干预的必要性,从而导致中央银行独立性的提高和对长期视野的关注。 然而,规则不能适应所有可能的事件,并且在撒切尔政府中产生了明显的问题。 该 US 1950-66和1985-2000之间的政策提供了证据表明,酌情政策可以产生良好的结果。 区分只有两种类型的中央银行家和完全控制价格水平的假设被认为是不现实的。

中央银行独立内部的授予 UK 在1997中可以被看作是对Barro-Gordon这样的理论文献中的推动力的回应。 在此之后,MPC据说随着长期通胀预期急剧下降而获得即时可信度。 下面的实证结果支持独立的中央银行维持低通货膨胀率的能力,而没有产出成本。 中央银行倾向于遵循费希尔关于工具独立性和目标依赖性的理论。 “约束性谨慎”的想法见于“ UK 如果通胀超出1pp目标,则大臣要求提交汇款信。 英国数量宽松政策的独立性从其“银行业务”(Mervyn King)的地位来看。 然而,在英国允许财政部门参加会议时,民主需要问责。

Reputation and delegation are two theoretical commitment solutions to the dynamic-inconsistency problem. (Romer, 2001). Reputation plays a role in monetary policy, in a state of uncertainty such as the UK, where the image of central bankers of inflation fighting is important to establish credibility thus incentivising them to achieve targets. This issue is seen as being “near..to the hearts of real central bankers” (Blinder) and is achieved by processes such as publishing votes.

Commitment solutions rely on the importance of expectations and are prominent in theory and practice of real world policy. This is reflected in the prominent role of the Bank of England’s inflation and output forecasts. However the New Keynesian Phillips Curve assumption that a rise in inflation expectations would give rise to inflation did not hold in recent times, as shown below.

Rogoffs’ proposal of delegating monetary policy to ‘Conservative central bankers’ that are more inflation-averse than the general public provided the “intellectual framework for the redesign of the central banks” (Clement, 2008). It has been influential in the Bank of England’s appointment choices with the Conservative views of insiders dominating monetary policy (Spencer, 2009). The need for the ‘optimal level of conservatism’ explains ‘flexible inflation targets’ in many central banks, and the inclusion of ‘outsiders’ within the MPC. The use of a one-shot game and its exclusion of a disinflation possibility (Hallett, Libich & Stehlik) disconnects it from reality.

Although there is no such inclusion of a ‘performance contract’ (Walsh, 1995) within monetary policy, the theory drew attention to optimal incentive structures for central banks, which is a current focus in the financial crisis literature. The use of an inflation target which allows for output stabilisation, seen in the Svensson model (1997), is correlates with this theory and is evident in most central banks. Svensson proposes an optimal reaction function similar to the Taylor Rule, which the UK’s MPC is said to follow (Spencer 2009). However due its ‘individualistic’ (Blinder) nature consolidated in the ‘one member one vote’ system, one rule could never account for the heterogeneous views within the MPC.

However Harris & Spencer model (2009) state that “the institutional status of Bank of England MPC members” holds more importance than differing reaction functions, The MPC contains five insiders appointed from within the bank, and four outsiders, appointed from other professions and academia. Theory correlates with practice, with insiders more likely to hold conservative views and vote as a block, when compared to outsiders.

The rapid change of the economy in the recent financial crisis has led to a disconnection between theory and practice. The ‘one tool, one target’ approach has proved inadequate in dealing with the financial crisis. Blanchflower (2009) stipulated the exclusion of the financial sector as the reason the Central Bank was slow to realise the severity of the crisis. The effect of the financial crisis confirms the view that theory arises from events, and their unpredictability means models will always contain shortfalls. Shortfalls are also evident in healthy economies. The complete markets assumption seen in such influential models like the DSGE and the ones discussed above does not hold in a world “characterised by herding behaviour & speculative bubbles” (Blanchflower, 2009). Critics cite the inclusion of fiscal policy within models as likely to alter results.

In conclusion, the models I have discussed have been influential in determining the institutional structure of the bank, the type of central banker appointed and how they are done so. They have signified the importance of the role of bank incentives and expectations in forming policy. However as the recent financial crisis has shown, in such a dynamic complicated world littered with uncertainties, generalised models can never satisfy all the demands of practical monetary policy.

参考书目

书籍

Blinder (1999), “Central Banking in Theory & Practice”

Romer (2001), “Advanced Macroeconomics”

文章

Barro, (1977), “Unanticipated Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States”, The American Economic Review

Barro, (1978), “Unanticipated Money, Output, and the Price Level in the United States”, The Journal of Political Economy

Fischer (1994), “How independent should a central bank be?” Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory

Hallett, Libich & Stehlik (2007), “Rogoff Revisited: The Conservative Central Banker Proposition Under Active Fiscal Policies”, CAMA Working Papers

Herrendorf, Berthold and Lockwood (1997), “Rogoff´s “conservative” central banker restored”, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking

Spencer & Harris (2009), “The Policy Choices and Reaction Functions of Bank of England MPC Members”, Southern Economic Journal

Spencer (2009), Lectures Notes for Loughborough University

Svensson (2009), “Optimal Inflation Targets, ‘Conservative Central Banks’ and Linear Inflation Contracts”, American Economic Review

Walsh (1995), “Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers”, The American Economic Review

网站

Bank of England, “Monetary Policy”, accessed at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/overview.htm on 22/11/2009

Bank of England, “Treasury Committee enquiry into the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England”, accessed at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/treasurycommittee/mpc/tsc070219.pdf on 23/11/2009

Bean , “Is there a New Consensus In Monetary Policy?”, accessed at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/monetary/bean070413.pdf on 23/11/2009

Blanchflower, “The Future of Monetary Policy” accessed at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech382.pdf on 24/11/2009

Clements, “A Rogoff Interview”, accessed at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4117 on 22/11/2009

Costain, “The Barro-Gordon model of Rules vs Discretion”, accessed at http://www.econ.upf.edu/~costain/theory4/bg.pdf on 22/11/2009 on 22/11/2009

Duncan, “King rounds on Cameron for trying to interfere in Quantitative Easing”, accessed at http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard-business/article-23767982-king-rounds-on-cameron-for-trying-to-interfere-in-quantitative-easing.do on 22/11/2009

Spencer Dale 2009 «Inflation targeting: Learning the lessons from the financial crisis» http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/speeches/2009/speech395.pdf

Svensson (2009), “Flexible Inflation Targeting: Lessons from Financial Targeting”, accessed at http://people.su.se/~leosven/papers/090921e.pdf on 21/11/2009


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